Christians in Syria and the civil war by Besenyő, János & Gömöri, Roland
219
CHRISTIANS IN SYRIA AND THE CIVIL WAR
János Besenyő - Roland Gömöri
List of contents
Introduction
Syria: a state of confl icts
The civil war
Christians in the Syrian civil war
Vulnerabilities of the Christian community in Syria
Migration from Syria and its risks
Potential outcomes of Syrian civil war
Introduction
The so-called “Arab Spring” has managed to stir up a great variety of 
conﬂ icts in the region of the Middle East and North Africa. Syria is 
the only country in the region where civil war is still raging between 
government forces and the various opposition groups. The article 
begins with a country background, highlighting what led to this conﬂ ict. 
Afterwards, an overview of Syria’s Christian community and their 
situation will be presented.
Finally, the authors of the article evaluate the different potential 
outcomes, and their possible effects on the Syrian Christians. There is 
the potential of a “French scenario,” where outside (mainly Western) 
powers step up in the defense of the local Christian communities. One 
should also account for the possibility of Assad successfully defending 
his position as the leader of Syria. The worst-case scenario would be that 
the global powers let Syria fall into chaos, and let the country be divided 
between the less or more radical Islamist groups that already exert more 
inﬂ uence than their secular counterparts, like the Free Syrian Army.
Relating to the civil war, there is one more issue that the article examines. 
The mass ﬂ ow of Syrian refugees (and among them large amounts of 
Christians) towards neighbouring Middle Eastern countries, as well 
as adjacent regions (emphasis on Europe) poses the question: do these 
refugees present a regional threat, as well as a threat to Central European 
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Syria: a state of conﬂ icts
Conﬂ icts are hardwired into the Syrian state. Its borders are artiﬁ cial, 
ﬁ nalized at the conference in San Remo, in 1920. The country houses a 
variety of religious denominations: a variety of Sunni and Shia groups 
(with the Alawites as the most important Shia branch), Druzes, and a 
wide range of Christian sects (discussed in detail later). There are ethnic 
divisions as well: besides the majority Arab population, the population 
also consists of Kurdish and Armenian minorities, to note only the two 
largest (CIA 2014).
The political system before the “Arab Spring” was deﬁ ned basically by 
the Syrian Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party. The system was underpinned 
by members of the Assad family and other Alawites, holding positions 
in the military and intelligence services, as well as governmental 
paramilitary groups. The Ba’athist government was also supported by 
leading families of other religious groups, with additional emphasis on 
Christians. These families had both business and personal interests in 
supporting the regime (Open Doors International 2014, 10-11).
Expectations of a reformist turn were largely hollow after Bashar al-
Assad’s inauguration, who continued on with his father’s policies. Both 
his suppressing of political activism and his position as the head of state 
originating from and favoring the Alawite minority, seated over a Sunni 
majority, generated dissent (Open Doors International 2014, 11).
Nevertheless,  the militancy and dissent that erupted in 2011 also 
stemmed from economic problems. The water crisis in the ﬁ rst decade 
of the 21st century, exacerbated by the faulty policies of the Syrian 
government, basically destroyed Syrian agriculture, as well as led to 
ﬁ erce urbanization, as the impoverished and hungry rural Syrians ﬂ owed 
to the cities in the western regions. This internal migration towards the 
urban areas led to an increasing social tension which could be regarded 
as the one of the real reasons that triggered the revolts in 2011 (Open 
Doors International 2014, 25).
The civil war
In 2011, the events of the “Arab Spring” triggered a chain of events 
also in Syria. People took to the streets, demanding socio-political 
and economic reforms. While answering several requests for reform, 
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President Assad also ordered the security forces of the government to 
engage protesters. Some members of the military refused to shoot at 
unarmed protesters, and their disillusionment of the regime contributed 
to desertions– of both  ofﬁ cers and rank and ﬁ le soldiers – to the 
opposition forces. Assad’s aggressive stance towards the protesters, 
combined with the formation of initial armed opposition groups from 
the defected soldiers and anti-Assad gunmen, escalated the conﬂ ict 
quickly (Open Doors International 2014, 11-12).
In the initial months of the uprising, the general opinion was that the 
“Arab Spring” would surely triumph like in other affected countries 
as Egypt, Libya, Yemen or Tunisia, for instance. However, as Wagner 
(2014, 4-5) points out, a few analysts argued that while the Syrian 
regime may be authoritarian, much like those of the aforementioned 
countries, it has several distinctive features that could prove pivotal for 
its survival. The Syrian opposition is far from united, an international 
intervention is unlikely, and as mentioned beforehand, Assad has the 
support of both his own Alawite group and other religious minorities, as 
well as some Sunni upper- and middle-class families. In addition, unlike 
in Egypt, most of the military – minus the deserters – was ﬁ rmly behind 
the regime.
The Syrian opposition consists of about 1,000 independent groups, but 
it can be narrowed down to four major military actors: the Free Syrian 
Army/the Supreme Military Command; the Syrian Islamic Front and 
Islamic Liberation Front; the Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State (of 
Iraq and Syria); and the (Kurdish) People’s Protection Units.143
During the course of the civil war, a “drift” towards the more Islamist 
elements of the Syrian opposition can be observed. While the Syrian Free 
Army had a central role in the initial period of the conﬂ ict, it gradually 
lost ground to radical Islamists or groups like the Jabhat al-Nusra that 
are expressly linked to Al-Qaeda. An explicit sign is the ﬂ ow of troops 
from the ranks of the Syrian Free Army towards the Islamist side of the 
opposition (Wagner 2014, 13).
Currently, the greatest threat to both regional stability and the security 
of Syria, and Christians in particular, is the ‘Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria’ (ISIS). Initially being the al-Qaeda’s branch in Iraq, the group of 
1 It must be noted however, that the Kurdish community in Syria is split between the supporters 
and the opposition of the Assad government, but basically strives to maintain a neutral stance, 
focusing on the defense of the autonomous Kurdish region. For more, see the report of Open 
Doors International (2014, 16) and Wagner (2014, 15).
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Sunni militants changed its name again on 30 June 2014 to the ‘Islamic 
State’ (IS), announcing its goal to found a new state, a caliphate – based 
on the strict observation of shari’a – in the territories it currently claims 
to control.
The Islamic State is in constant conﬂ ict with all the participants of the 
Syrian civil war, both government and opposition. The organization 
managed to gain a lot of enemies by recklessly forcing out every other 
opposition group from the areas controlled by the Syrian opposition, as 
well as deliberately targeting and executing the leaders of other groups 
– in the already paciﬁ ed rear area (Wagner 2014, 17).
The Islamic State, as it announced, plans the strict implementation of 
shari’a on the territories under its control, and its treatment towards 
civilians in these areas does not lack cruelty, especially towards those 
who criticize its actions (Wagner 2014, 13). Christians living in Syria 
are no exception, as will be discussed later.
The conﬂ ict in Syria, even though it was described initially as a clash 
between “government” and “opposition,” has turned increasingly 
sectarian, with Sunni rebels on one side, and the Shia government on 
the other side. Christians are caught in the crossﬁ re between the two 
parties, being categorized as natural allies and protégés of the Assad 
government.
Christians in the Syrian civil war
Christians in Syria belong to a wide range of denominations and 
ethnicities: there are groups of Arab Greek Orthodox, Armenian 
Orthodox, Arab Greek Catholic, Assyrian Orthodox, Syriac Orthodox, 
Maronite Catholic, Chaldean Catholic, and Syriac Catholic Christians. 
The majority – about 500,000 – of Syrian Christians belong to the Greek 
Orthodox Church, most of them Arabs, with a small number of ethnic 
Greeks. The second largest is the Armenian Orthodox Church, with 
an estimated number of 110,000-160,000 ethnic Armenian members, 
followed by the ethnic Syriac Orthodox Church with 89,000 members 
(Open Doors International 2014, 29).
The Christians are a signiﬁ cant minority in Syria, with their overall 
numbers estimated around 2.3 million, constituting around 10 percent 
of the population. Geographically, the Christian minority is in a more 
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challenging position than the Alawites and the Kurds. The latter are 
largely concentrated in one region: the Alawites in the Mediterranean 
coastal region (Latakia, Tartus), and the Kurds in three speciﬁ c northern 
governorates (Aleppo, Idlib and al-Hasakah). Christians, though, are 
distributed throughout the country, with the largest concentrations 
found in  the cities of Aleppo and Damascus, as well as in the southern 
areas of the Homs governorate, close to the Syrian-Lebanese border. 
Incidentally, these are the main conﬂ ict zones of the civil war, increasing 
the Christians’ exposure to the conﬂ ict (Open Doors International 2014, 
29).
One of the main groups supporting  Assad are the so-called Popular 
Committees associated with the Syrian minorities – not only Christians, 
but also Druze and Alawites – and are reported to be tasked with the 
defense of sectarian villages and minority enclaves like Christian 
districts. Their mobilization, training and deployment are believed to 
be supported by Iran and, to a lesser extent, Hezbollah (Open Doors 
International 2014, 15).
While President Assad can more or less count   on the support of the 
majority of Christians, their stance in the civil war is far more nuanced. 
Some Christians assume leading positions in the Syrian opposition 
movement, and the Free Syrian Army includes some brigades, called 
the ‘Partisans of God Brigades’, that are comprised entirely of Christian 
militants calling for a non-sectarian Syria free from the rule of the Assad 
family (Open Doors International 2014, 31).
Vulnerabilities of the Christian community in Syria
Christians in Syria are exceptionally vulnerable to the ongoing civil war. 
Besides factors that affect the whole population (lack of environmental 
security, conﬁ scation of lands, famine – especially in opposition-held 
areas, disruption of healthcare services), there are vulnerabilities speciﬁ c 
to their population. In order to provide a comprehensive picture, these 
will be listed henceforth in detail.
As was pointed out before, Christians, unlike other denominations in 
Syria, are not deﬁ nitely supporting any one side of the conﬂ ict: while 
some groups support the Assad-led government, others are prominent 
members of the secular wing of the Syrian opposition. Even still, others 
strive to maintain a relatively neutral stance in the conﬂ ict, wishing only 
3224
CHRISTIANS IN SYRIA AND THE CIVIL WAR
to police Christian areas, and protect them against (mainly opposition) 
violence. In either case, as the civil war turns increasingly sectarian, 
Christian communities are becoming more and more militarized, mostly 
driven by  fear of repercussions from mainly Sunni opposition militants 
that associate them with the supporters of the regime. However, this 
militarization that goes forward with the assistance of the Assad 
government (Open Doors International 2014, 43), further fuels the 
suspicions of the opposition that Christians are enemies of the opposition.
There is also an overall fear of radical Muslim organizations amongst 
the Syrian Christian population. In the majority of cases it is due to 
threats against local Christian communities, results in Christians 
cancelling their religious celebrations, or, in some cases, Islamist groups 
demanding jizya, the religious poll tax infamous among Middle Eastern 
Christians.244 Examples for jizya extortion include demands by the al-
Farouq Battalions in the city of Homs in 2012 (Open Doors International 
2014, 35), and by ISIS in the Syrian province of Raqqa in February 2014 
(BBC 2014c; Daily Telegraph 2014).
Another problem is that Christians are usually without any protection, 
whether from opposition militias or criminals; partly because they 
generally do not organize in militias (with the exception of the 
aforementioned Popular Committees), and are not in a position strong 
enough to defend themselves; partly because in the current situation, the 
government is unable and unwilling to come to the defense of the Syrian 
Christian minority Open Doors International (2014, 52).
Women in general, but especially Christian women, are also facing threats 
of sexual abuse in the Syrian conﬂ ict. These abuses can be attributed 
both to common criminals, bolstered by impunity in the current security 
environment, and Islamist ﬁ ghters. In the case of the latter, according to 
the report of Open Doors International (2014, 62), the fatwas of certain 
Sunni clerics expressly justify the rape of non-Sunni women.
Another observation is that the proportion of Christians which qualify 
as IDPs345 and refugees is comparatively high, due to the fact that they are 
concentrated in conﬂ ict zones. According to ofﬁ cial numbers provided 
by UNHCR (2014), there are on the whole almost 3 million Syrian 
2 Jizya is a certain kind of ‘protection money’ paid by dhimmi (‘people of the book’, referring to 
Christians and Jews) to Muslims as a sign of submission. In exchange, Christians can practice 
their religion with certain constraints: building or renovation of churches, as well as displaying 
religious symbols (like the cross) outside churches is forbidden, in addition to other similar 
rules set down in the Conditions of Omar. See: Ibrahim (2014).
3 Internally displaced persons.
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refugees in the surrounding countries (the consequences of this are 
discussed later).
However, these are only the ofﬁ cial numbers by the UN, and one can 
expect a much higher number of refugees, as the exact number of 
Christian refugees is hard to determine, due to both their reluctance to 
register and to the fact that NGOs and refugee programmes do not keep 
records of the religious afﬁ liation of refugees.
One of the reasons behind this decision could be a general distrust of the 
international community’s willingness to step up to their defense, which 
may be rooted in the tragedy of Iraqi Christians, which has largely gone 
unnoticed since 2003446 ignored by the international authorities; it is also 
one of the driving forces behind the mass Christian migration from 
the country. Yet another reason why Christians do not register at the 
UNHCR camps is the fear of persecution inside the refugee camps by 
their Muslim compatriots, as well as for men, the fear of being drafted 
into the opposition forces.
An additional problem stems from the following issue: as Christians tend 
not to register with the refugee services of the UN, they have less legal 
protection in the countries they turn to for asylum. Also, their refugee 
status makes their self-sustenance difﬁ cult, since they cannot work in 
the countries that provide them asylum (Open Doors International 2014, 
60). For Christians, alternatives to the refugee camps are either internal 
displacement or churches and monasteries in the target countries.
Migration from Syria and its risks
The ﬂ ow of refugees originating from Syria represents a huge challenge 
for the region. Currently almost 3 million registered refugees are housed 
in UNHCR camps (UNHCR 2014), and this accounts only for the 
number of registered refugees – as discussed in detail above. 
According to this data, most refugees target Lebanon and Turkey, with 
smaller numbers going to Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. Lebanon houses 
the largest numbers of Syrian refugees, about 1.1 million. This poses 
a signiﬁ cant risk to the stability of Lebanon, especially when we take 
into account the fragile inter-sectarian “contract” based on the ratio of 
4 Before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, about 1 million Christians lived under the regime of Saddam 
Hussein. Currently, it is reported that no Christians remain in the country, among others due to 
the actions of the Islamic State (formerly ISIS). See: Ibrahim (2014).
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denominations making up the population. Another problem is presented 
by the fact that while Lebanese Shias support the Assad government, 
Sunnis provide aid for the rebels (Syrian politics were already deﬁ ned 
by the stance of Syria’s neighbours since the assassination of the Prime 
Minister Raﬁ q Hariri in 2005)547 and the role of the Shia organization 
Hezbollah in the Syrian civil war further complicates the issue. 
Refugees put a complex strain on Lebanon. Firstly, as mentioned before, 
sectarian tensions are at an all-time high, worsened by the inﬂ ux of 
mostly Sunni rebels, including jihadists. What’s more, there is ongoing 
fear that the Syrian conﬂ ict might spill over into Lebanon; there are 
already sectarian clashes routinely taking place in the city of Tripoli, a 
port city about 30 kilometres from the Syrian border. Secondly, Lebanese 
authorities do not handle the refugees adequately who are scattered 
throughout the country, sometimes living in dire conditions. Thirdly, the 
refugees put an increasing burden on the Lebanese economy, further 
exacerbating tensions in the country (Khatib 2014). Similar observations 
can be made in the case of the other neighbouring countries that have to 
deal with a large numbers of possibly radical Islamist refugees, which 
presents a potential security risk. 
According to the Neighbourhood Migration Report of the EU’s 
Migration Policy Centre (2013, 216), there are 131,108 migrants in 
the EU that originate from Syria, concentrated in Germany (34,229), 
Sweden (22,357), France (15,510) and the UK (11,000).
According to a more recent data, up until 11 January 2014, there were 
almost 60,000 Syrian refugees in the European Union who have ﬁ led 
for political asylum since the beginning of the conﬂ ict in Syria. Most of 
them are concentrated in Germany (24,900 applications) and in Sweden 
(23,500 applications), while Central European countries house only a 
smaller amount (about 4,500) of refugees, with Hungary accepting 995 
asylum requests (Syrian Refugees 2014).
These include all Syrian refugees, since – as discussed before – migration 
statistics do not reﬂ ect religious afﬁ liation. However, one should note 
that besides the civilians ﬂ eeing the clashes between Syrian government 
and opposition, there are also members of the opposition among the 
refugees, and as the opposition includes all kinds of ideologies from the 
more secular to the outright jihadist, these Syrian refugees could prove 
to be a security risk.
5 For more details, see the relevant section of Besenyő and Gömöri (2013).
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Potential outcomes of the Syrian civil war
The Syrian civil war may prove to be a very intractable and divisive 
conﬂ ict. Currently, there are several scenarios that represent the possible 
outcomes of the war. Henceforth, these will be presented. It must be 
noted, however, that in the case of each scenario, there is the possibility 
that certain armed resistance groups will remain and continue ﬁ ghting 
against the victor.
The “French scenario”
The French classically assumed a “protector” role of the Middle Eastern 
Christians, beginning with the ‘capitulation’ agreement between France 
and the Ottoman Empire in 1535 – the ﬁ rst of such agreements of the 
Ottomans with Western powers. This agreement recognised the special 
role of the French in the defense of Christians in the region. The French 
Consul General in Jerusalem has reafﬁ rmed France’s role as such in his 
speech in November 2013, both as a response to the Christian discontent 
over France’s support to the Syrian rebels, and probably also to the 
renewed efforts of the Russian Federation in the region (Bernardelli 
2013).
In the case of the aforementioned “French” scenario, the international 
community would intervene in the defense of the local Christian 
communities.
Until recently, this scenario was highly improbable. Nevertheless, with 
the aggressive expansion of the Islamic State – both in Iraq and Syria 
– the United States has decided to take action against the organization. 
Recently, the Hungarian government also made statements favoring 
intervention in the region, condemning the actions of the Islamic State 
against minorities, and Christians in particular. It also decided to send a 
relief shipment to the area (Hungarian Government 2014a and 2014b). 
Western actions – which include the UK and France besides the US 
– focus for now mainly on Iraqi territories and providing support to 
Kurdish military forces defending the autonomous Kurdish region 
against the Islamic State (BBC 2014b). But one could expect that the 
crackdown on the Islamic State could follow, and extend to challenge 
the IS’s positions in Syria.
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Assad retains power
This scenario envisages the victory of Syrian government forces in 
the civil war, ultimately leading to Bashar al-Assad managing to hold 
on to his position as the leader of Syria. While not likely in the short 
term, the recent inﬁ ghting between the Islamic State and the rest of the 
Syrian opposition could weaken their positions and prove useful for the 
government forces.
As the Open Doors report (2014, 77) argues, such a scenario would 
lead to the removal of two main threats to Syria’s Christian community: 
Islamism and the absence of the rule of law. However, it still poses a 
question whether a possible Western intervention following on the heels 
of that in Iraq would assist the Assad government, given the previous 
stance of Western powers favoring the Syrian – increasingly Islamist – 
opposition.
An Islamist Syria
A third scenario involves an Islamist victory in Syria, leading to the 
establishment of an Islamic state in Syria. This could be regarded as 
one of the worst-case scenarios for Christians, since their freedom to 
practice their religion would surely be curbed. As mentioned before, 
there were already threats made coming from certain elements of the 
Syrian Islamic Front targeting Christians (Open Doors International 
2014, 35).
The extent of the oppression of the Christian minority could differ. In the 
case of a state like Iran or Saudi Arabia, strict government control would 
be exercised over any area of life, including religion. Due to Syrian 
ethnic composition, a case like Egypt could also occur, where rights of 
Christians are suppressed, but the community is tolerated (Open Doors 
International 2014, 77).
An Islamist state
This scenario could be considered as a variant of an “Islamist Syria” 
scenario. In this case, the Islamic State (formerly ISIS) would manage 
to establish a “caliphate state” on the territory of parts of Syria and Iraq. 
This could lead to local Christians being demoted to a dhimmi legal 
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state, paying the jizya in order to practice their religion in a strictly state-
controlled fashion, effectively as third-rate citizens. Events like the one 
in Raqqa conﬁ rm suspicions that non-Sunni citizens of an Islamic State 
would be faced with three options: conversion to Islam, paying the jizya, 
or the “sword.”
While recent US actions aid the Iraqi Kurds in their defense against 
the Islamic State offensive, at the time of the writing of this article it is 
reported that IS militants made further advances in the Aleppo region 
of Syria, managing to seize several towns (BBC 2014a). Furthermore, 
looking back at the consequences of the intervention in Libya begs 
a question whether Western forces can effectively counter Islamist 
tendencies in the Middle East.
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